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REGULATING THE FINANCIAL ANALYSIS INDUSTRY:  IS THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE 
EFFECTIVE? 
In recent years, the US and the EC have witnessed the adoption of new regulations focused on 
financial analysts. This study investigates whether the European regulation, known as the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD), changed the distribution of recommendations and increased their 
credibility. We find that the proportion of favorable recommendations significantly decreased 
and, to a lesser extent, that the proportion of unfavorable recommendations increased after the 
adoption of MAD. However, MAD did not completely eliminate overly optimistic 
recommendations emanating from financial institutions facing conflicts of interest. Concerning 
the market reaction to recommendations, we find that “Upgrades” and “Positive initiations” 
generated more positive abnormal returns post-MAD. Conversely, “Downgrades” generated more 
negative abnormal returns. We show that differences in investor protection across EC countries 
explain abnormal returns associated with analyst recommendations. We also find that financial 
institutions with reputation capital at stake were less prone to optimism and that conflicts of 
interest were not a significant determinant of the stock market reaction to recommendations either 
pre- or post-MAD. Finally, we examine whether the US regulation, adopted about two years 
before MAD, spilt over into the EC, making MAD redundant. Our results show that favorable 
recommendations on stocks listed on an EC stock exchange became dramatically less positive, 
and unfavorable ones became more negative following the adoption of the US regulations. 
However, investors reacted to this change only when MAD was adopted. Therefore, MAD has its 
own legitimacy, not because it changed analysts’ behavior but because it heightened investor 
awareness of the change in analysts’ behavior. 
Key words: financial analysts, conflicts of interest, recommendations, Market Abuse Directive, 
European Union. 
JEL classification: G12, G14, G24, G28, K22, M48 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the US and the EC have witnessed the adoption of new regulations aimed at prohibiting 
selective disclosures of inside information and at curbing conflicts of interest affecting financial analysts. 
These regulations can be summarized as follows. First, corporate managers are not allowed to release 
information to any third party without disclosing it immediately to all market participants. Second, 
analysts’ reports must include information useful in interpreting research outputs. Third, analysts have to 
disclose any business relationship with the firms they recommend. 
The effectiveness of analyst research regulation deserves a thorough examination since, as noted by 
Mehran and Stulz (2007, p. 37), “…the majority of the papers do not suggest that analyst conflict of 
interest arising from investment banking activities had a systematic and persistent impact on the customers 
of analyst services”. The empirical evidence from the US has failed to establish that investors are misled 
by biased research since market participants discount recommendations subject to conflicts of interest; see 
Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), O’Brien, Mc Nichols and Lin (2005), Agrawal 
and Chen (2008) among others. This suggests that regulations devoted to analyst conflicts of interest 
might be unnecessary. Regarding Europe, two additional characteristics are likely to mitigate the impact of 
conflicts of interest. First, Clement, Rees and Swanson (2003) and Bolliger (2004) show that forecast 
accuracy is not a major factor in analysts’ career progression. This is probably why Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006) find that optimism in recommendations is lower in Europe than in the US. Second, European 
financial institutions providing investment research are mainly universal banks. Being more diversified in 
terms of revenue than their US counterparts, they are expected to put less pressure on sell-side analysts to 
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win new business and to promote M&A deals, IPOs or security offerings by issuing overoptimistic 
recommendations. 
This study examines the effectiveness of the European provisions regulating analyst research (i.e. the 
Market Abuse Directive, generally referred to as MAD) by analyzing their impact both on the distribution 
of analysts’ recommendations and on the abnormal stock returns associated with those recommendations. 
We find that the proportion of favorable recommendations (“Buy” and “Strong Buy”), which represents 
more than 48% of the recommendations under study, significantly decreased after the adoption of MAD. 
Conversely, but to a lesser extent, the proportion of unfavorable recommendations (“Sell” and “Strong 
Sell”) increased. In addition, this change was more pronounced for recommendations issued on firms 
listed in countries where investor protection is high. Financial institutions providing investment banking 
services should be more prone to optimism because positive opinions are expected to attract investment 
banking business. Consistent with this idea, we show that, before the implementation of MAD, financial 
institutions exposed to conflicts of interest because of their investment banking activities released more 
favorable and fewer unfavorable recommendations than their peers facing no apparent conflicts. The 
adoption of MAD has reduced the proportion of favorable recommendations for both categories of 
institutions. Unsurprisingly, the decrease was more pronounced for those facing conflicts of interest. This 
is not the case for unfavorable recommendations. Financial institutions subject to conflicts of interest have 
issued fewer negative opinions than their peers with no apparent conflicts either pre- or post-MAD. The 
adoption of MAD has increased the proportion of unfavorable recommendations only for institutions with 
no apparent conflicts. Finally, if reputation is an important deterrent of conflicts of interest, financial 
institutions with strong reputation capital at stake should be less unduly optimistic than their peers; see 
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Fang and Yasuda (2006), Ljunqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006). In addition, because MAD increases 
the visibility of recommendation distributions, the drop (increase) in favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations should be more pronounced for highly reputed institutions. Our results confirm this 
intuition. Highly reputed institutions issued a lower proportion of favorable recommendations before the 
adoption of MAD than their less reputed competitors. Following the implementation of MAD, the 
proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations issued by the former dropped (increased) more 
significantly compared to the latter. 
In order to determine whether MAD has resulted in more credible recommendations, we examine the 
stock price response to recommendation releases. Since MAD was designed to restore trust in favorable 
recommendations, these should be associated with higher returns in the aftermath of the regulation. In 
contrast, because they became slightly more frequent, unfavorable recommendations might be associated 
with less significant negative returns. Controlling the quantity and the quality of information conveyed by 
recommendations, and considering differences in the level of cross-border investor protection, differences 
in conflicts of interest and differences in the reputation of financial institutions, our results show that 
abnormal returns generated by recommendations are significantly higher (lower) for “Upgrades” and 
“Positive initiations” (“Downgrades”) since the adoption of MAD.  Interestingly, we show that disclosure 
of potential conflicts resulting from analysts’ ties with the companies they recommend did not change the 
stock market reaction to their recommendations. Conflicts of interest did not affect abnormal returns 
associated with “Upgrades” and “Positive initiations” either pre or post-MAD. During the same two 
periods, “Downgrades” issued by analysts facing conflicts of interest generated more negative abnormal 
returns than those issued by analysts with no apparent conflicts. We interpret these findings as evidence 
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that investors, who interpret optimistic recommendations conservatively, discounted optimistic 
recommendations appropriately before the adoption of MAD. In conjunction with investor protection, 
these results explain why European stocks react less to recommendations than US ones. We also find that 
reputation acts as a moderating factor of conflicts of interest induced by investment banking activities both 
before and after the adoption of MAD. 
Numerous recommendations on European stocks are issued by financial institutions having to comply 
with the US regulations on analyst research (Reg FD, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472). Therefore, 
conflicts of interest in the EC may have been resolved, at least partially, by the US regulations that became 
effective more than two years prior to the adoption of MAD. Consequently, we check whether 
recommendations on European stocks issued by financial institutions operating in the US were affected by 
the adoption of the US regulations. Specifically, we compare the distribution of these recommendations 
and their associated abnormal stock returns before and after the adoption of US regulations. We find that 
the proportion of positive recommendations issued on European stocks decreased dramatically as soon as 
the US regulations were adopted. Conversely, the proportion of negative recommendations increased. 
However, abnormal returns did not change until MAD was adopted.  
Our results complement the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study investigating the 
consequences of conflicts of interest on analyst research in an alternative institutional environment to the 
US
1
. Second, we provide evidence showing that the EC regulation on market abuse was useful, at least for 
some investors, because it aligned analysts’ recommendations with their original intent. Third, we 
                                                 
1
 Mehran and Stulz have identified 397 papers on www.ssrn.com with “conflicts of interest” in the title or in the abstract prior to 
July 2006. On December 31
st
, 2007, this number came to 524. These numbers show that research in this field is abundant. 
Surprisingly, it is exclusively based on US data. 
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demonstrate that conflicts of interest are less acute in Europe than in the US and that reputation matters. 
Fourth, we show that national securities regulations are necessary despite the globalization of financial 
markets. The US regulatory system had a spillover effect on recommendations of EC stocks that became 
less optimistic after US regulations were passed. However, investors did not react to this shift until the 
European regulation became binding. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes the provisions of 
MAD. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 describes the sample selection. Section 5 
provides empirical results on the impact of MAD on the distribution of recommendations. Section 6 
examines how stock prices reacted to these changes. Section 7 presents evidence concerning the spill-over 
of US regulations into the EC and Section 8 presents our conclusions. 
2. Regulation of investment research in the EC  
In 1999, the European Commission launched the Financial Services Action Plan with the aim of 
promoting a fully integrated European financial market. To this end, several directives were adopted, 
among which Directive 2003/6/EC on ‘Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation’ in January 2003. This 
Directive, known colloquially as Market Abuse Directive, was complemented by two implementing 
Commission Directives, CD 2003/124/EC and CD 2003/125/EC in December 2003. European directives 
become legally binding only when they are incorporated into national laws. MAD gave Member States 
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until October 12
th
, 2004 to transpose the provisions into local legislation
2
; see Ferrani (2004) and Hansen 
(2004).  
The first objective of MAD is to preclude selective disclosures of information. Managers “must make 
complete and effective public disclosure of (all relevant) information, simultaneously in the case of an 
intentional disclosure and promptly in the case of a non-intentional disclosure” (Directive 2003/6/EC, 
article 6.3).  Relevant information is price-sensitive information, i.e. “information which, if it were made 
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price” (CD2003/124, article 1). These provisions 
are very similar to those of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) adopted in 2000 by the SEC with the 
aim of eliminating trading profits resulting from unequal access to information. Under Rule 100 of Reg 
FD, managers are required to release material information simultaneously to all investors. The information 
has to be released promptly to all market participants if it was inadvertently disclosed. 
The second objective of MAD is to harmonize standards for the “fair, clear and accurate presentation of 
information and disclosure of interests and conflicts of interest”
3
. In order to make analysts accountable 
for their recommendations, the identity of the persons, i.e. their name and job title, who prepared the 
recommendation and the name of the person legally responsible for the recommendation, must be 
disclosed. Recommendations made by teams of analysts with no individual names are therefore implicitly 
forbidden
4
. Facts must be clearly distinguished from opinions and interpretations. Estimates, which 
include forecasts and price targets, must be labeled as such. The methodology used to evaluate financial 
                                                 
2
 Germany did this on October 30
th
, 2004, but most Member States transposed MAD into national laws during the second 
semester of 2005 (i.e. Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain) or even later (Belgium).  
3
 Official Journal of the European Union, December 24, 2003, L339/73. 
4
 Before the adoption of MAD, the proportion of recommendations issued by teams accounted for 20% of the recommendations 
issued by European analysts, see Bolliger (2004). 
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instruments must be described. In addition to the time horizon and risk, the date at which the 
recommendation was released must be prominently indicated. Interestingly, any change in a 
recommendation that was issued during the last twelve months must be clearly indicated. Furthermore, 
financial institutions providing recommendations are required to disclose every quarter the proportion of 
“Buy”, “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations issued for all stocks they follow.   
The last objective of MAD is to limit the consequences of potential conflicts of interest that materialize 
at the level of the individuals who prepare the recommendation or have access to it before dissemination 
to market participants. Acknowledging the impossibility of completely eliminating these conflicts, the 
regulator adopted a pragmatic strategy. It consists of making investors aware of the conflicts by forcing the 
disclosure of any relevant information that might potentially affect the nature of the recommendation. 
Financial institutions are required to disclose the “effective organizational and administrative 
arrangements set up […] for the prevention and avoidance of conflicts of interest” (CD2003/125, article 
6.2). They must report on how the remuneration of the person preparing the recommendation is tied to 
investment banking transactions. Any person involved in the production of the recommendation must 
release her links with the recommended firm. Having acted as a lead manager or a co-lead manager in any 
securities offerings (stocks and bonds) or having advised the recommended firm in a M&A over the 
twelve months preceding the recommendation must be disclosed as well. Finally, disclosure must be made 
if the financial institution recommending a firm holds a stake of 5% or more in the capital of the 
recommended firm or, conversely, if the recommended firm holds a stake of 5% or more in the capital of 
the financial institution. 
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The provisions of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, adopted in the US in 2002, are very similar 
to those of MAD regulating conflicts of interest and the fair presentation of recommendations. They both 
impose disclosure of information helping to understand research outputs and to identify potential conflicts 
of interests. Several minor discrepancies are, however, noticeable. MAD does not make any reference to 
the individual protection of financial analysts from persons involved in investment banking activities 
working for the same financial institution. Nor does it refer to the educational level of financial analysts, 
or to the ban on reviewing the report before publication made on companies that are the subject of the 
research report. In contrast, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 do not mention shareholding as a 
source of conflict. However, the main difference between the EC and the US regulations lies in the fact 
that there is no unified enforcement in the EC. MAD applies to all financial instruments admitted to 
trading on a regulated market of an EC Member State.  Consequently, financial institutions issuing analyst 
reports have to comply with the rules of the Member State where recommended firms are listed5; see 
Enriques (2005). The competent country for supervising the enforcement of MAD is the one where the 
financial instrument is traded. Depending on the country, violations of the rules are considered as 
administrative, civil or criminal offenses and the penalties incurred vary widely from country to country; 
see Freshfields, Bruckhaus and Deringer (2006).  
3. New regulations and analysts’ recommendations: Previous research 
Before turning to the evaluation of MAD, we briefly review previous research examining the 
consequences of Reg FD, NASD Rule 2711, or NYSE Rule 472 for the US stock markets. 
                                                 
5
 Official Journal of the European Union, April 12
th
, 2003, L96/18 al. 35.  
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3.1. Selective disclosure  
The introduction of Reg FD was highly disputed. Proponents of the regulation argue that, by creating 
information asymmetries, selective disclosure creates opportunities for trading profits at the expense of 
uninformed investors, thus reducing liquidity and increasing the cost of capital of listed firms. Opponents 
argue that private conversations and conference calls are essential to maximize the information flow. 
Prohibiting the use of this source of information reduces the quantity and the quality of available 
information and, therefore, market efficiency. 
Previous research essentially studied whether Reg FD reduced the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and modified their dispersion; see Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003), Sunder (2003), 
Brown, Hillegiest and Lo (2004), Eleswarapu, Thomson and Venkataraman (2004), Agrawal, Chadha and 
Chen (2006), Mohanram and Sunder (2006) and Ahmed and Schneible (2007).  There is no empirical 
evidence of a dramatic effect of Reg FD on either the quantity or the quality of available information.  
Concerning recommendations, Reg FD did not alter the impact of downgrades and upgrades on stock 
prices either; see Ferreira and Smith (2006). However, since the adoption of Reg FD, investors attribute 
less value to recommendations that previously could have benefited from private disclosure, i.e. those 
issued by financial institutions with investment banking ties with the recommended firms; see Cornett, 
Tehranian and Yalcin (2007). 
3.2. Conflicts of interest and analysts’ forecasts and recommendations 
Two recent surveys examine the extensive empirical literature devoted to conflicts of interest in the 
financial analysis industry; see Dubois and Dumontier (2006) and Mehran and Stulz (2007). Both 
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underline the unequivocal evidence showing that earnings forecasts are not affected by conflicts of 
interest, at least for stocks listed in the US. A straightforward reason for these results, empirically 
confirmed by Ljunqvist et al. (2006), is that favorable forecasts do not attract investment banking 
business. This is probably because analysts build their reputation on the accuracy of their earnings 
forecasts, which is easily assessable ex-post. In contrast, erroneous investment recommendations are much 
more difficult to detect. Hence, this is where analysts’ propensity to issue biased research may come into 
play. Analyst optimism about the firms they recommend is a well established fact in the US stock market. 
There are at least three reasons for analysts to be optimistic. First, analysts may be positively biased 
because they follow firms that have good future prospects (endogenous selection) and they give up 
following firms which are not as promising. Second, positive recommendations generate more trades 
because short selling is not always possible. Thus, they have no incentive to issue negative advice. Third, 
conflicts of interest, and in particular, conflicts of interest related to investment banking, are a natural 
source of optimism.  
In accordance with the optimism bias hypothesis, empirical studies find that affiliated analysts and, 
more generally, analysts working for investment banks issue recommendations with significant upward 
biases; see Michaely and Womack (1999) and O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005), James and Karceski 
(2006). These findings are highly disputed, however, and opposing views are held by many academics; see 
Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006), Jacob, Rock and Weber (2007), Lin and McNichols (1998), 
McNichols, O’Brien and Pamukcu (2006) and Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2007). 
Systematically following recommendations issued by investment banks hurts investor’s portfolio 
performance because these banks are reluctant to downgrade stocks compared to independent research 
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firms; see Barber, Lehavy and Truman (2007). More specifically, Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2007) 
show that small investors tend to trade more after upgraded and “Buy” recommendations than they do 
after downgraded and “Sell” recommendations. In particular, small investors take all recommendations for 
granted while sophisticated investors trade only on “Strong Buy” or “Strong Sell” recommendations; see 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007). These findings suggest that small investors are the main victims of 
analyst conflicts of interest. Sophisticated investors are immune from the biases that contaminate 
recommendations. 
Theoretically, Hayes (1998) proves that incentives to generate trading commissions affect both the 
accuracy and the availability of analysts’ reports. In particular, incentives to provide research are stronger 
for stocks which are expected to perform well. For these stocks, reports are more accurate because analysts 
gather more information. As Irvine (2001) shows, brokerage activities also distort analysts’ judgment 
because brokerage volume is higher for covered stocks and coverage helps brokers increase their market 
share. Jackson (2005) finds that favorable recommendations issued by brokerage firms increase stock 
trades in the short run. Both theoretical and empirical results show that brokerage activities alone can 
induce biased research. 
The results presented above suggest that regulating analysts’ activities could be, to a large extent, 
unnecessary for three major reasons. First, financial institutions with a strong stake in investment banking 
services must preserve their credibility. This prevents them from issuing misleading forecasts or 
recommendations. Second, competition moderates the propensity to issue overly optimistic 
recommendations; see Hong and Kacperczyk (2007) and Sette (2007). The introduction of additional 
constraints could deter competition and, as a result, reduce or even annihilate the beneficial effects of 
Dubois-Dumontier - Regulating the Financial Analysis Industry:  Is the European Directive Effective? 
 12 
regulatory reforms. Third, sophisticated investors mainly focus on earnings forecasts that do not suffer 
from conflicts of interest and they are aware of the biases affecting recommendations. Consequently, the 
benefits of regulating financial analysts could be limited to better protecting small investors from 
opportunistic behavior of analysts working for non-reputable investment banks or for brokerage 
institutions involved in securities trading that cover firms which are followed by few analysts. In such a 
setting, a regulation applicable to the financial analysis industry as a whole could generate costs far 
exceeding the expected benefits. 
4. Data and sample 
Our initial sample consists of all recommendations issued on EC firms listed in the following countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The period under study starts January 1
st
, 1998 and ends on May 30
th
, 2007. 
Due to lagged variables, the information was collected from 1997 onward.  
We use three sources of data. First, daily stock prices and national stock market indices were collected 
from Datastream from January 1
st
, 1997 to May 30
th
, 2007
6
. Second, analyst recommendations and 
forecasts were collected from the I/B/E/S International Historical Detail File database. As discussed 
previously, MAD applies to brokers with their headquarters or a branch in the EC. Hence, we retained 
recommendations issued by brokers who were under the jurisdiction of a country member of the EC. 
Consistent with previous research, we also excluded recommendations for which the following 
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information was missing: firm, broker or currency codes. Financial institutions issuing fewer than five 
recommendations over the sample period were also eliminated. 
From the Security Data Company’s (SDC) database, we collected firms involved in IPOs, SEOs, debt 
issuance and M&As. We also collected bookrunner and manager names, the amount and the date at which 
transactions took place from January 1st, 1997 to December 31st, 2006.  Merging I/B/E/S and Datastream 
data can be done easily using tickers and dates, whereas merging I/B/E/S and SDC data is far more 
challenging. To do so, we used the broker name associated with the broker masked code and manually 
matched the names of the bookrunner(s), manager(s) and advisor(s) in the SDC. Nelson Directories helped 
us determine which recommendations were issued by independent research firms with no brokerage 
business and no investment banking business. We found no recommendations made by such firms in our 
sample. 
Table 1, Panel A, reports summary statistics of recommendations released from January 1st, 1998 to 
May 30
th
, 2007 sorted by country. Column 1 and column 2 indicate the number of firms and the number of 
brokers appearing in the sample. Overall, the sample contains 5 106 firms. The average number of firms 
per year is 2 613. The total number of brokers is 273 and the average number per year is 154. Column 3 
shows the number of recommendations sorted by country and year, and columns 4 to 8 show the number 
of recommendations split by level (Strong Buy, Buy, Neutral, Sell, and Strong Sell).  
Insert <Table 1> about here 
                                                                                                                                                                            
6
 Datastream translated prices of the Euro zone stocks in EUR before 01/01/1999. The exchange rate depends on the country 
but is constant for every stock so that it has no impact on most stock returns. I/B/E/S did not follow the same rule, which 
means an adjustment had to be made from 1996 to 1999 for earnings. 
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In accordance to their stock market size, three countries, namely Great Britain, Germany and France 
account for 68% of the firms and 61% of the recommendations. The studied recommendations are issued 
on firms listed in countries where securities laws stem from an English legal origin (31%), a French legal 
origin (40%), a German legal origin (16%) or a Scandinavian legal origin (13%). 
Panel B shows the statistics by year. Contrary to conventional belief that more regulation should 
discourage brokers from making recommendations, there is no clear break in the number of 
recommendations over time. The proportion of “Strong Buy” (17.55%) and “Buy” (29.42%) is much 
lower than in the US over a comparable period. Conversely, the proportion of “Strong Sell” (5.15%) and 
“Sell” (13.08) is higher, confirming that the structure of recommendations is different in Europe from that 
observed in the US; see Jegadeesh and Kim (2006, p. 282). 
5. Did MAD change the distribution of recommendations?  
To gauge the effectiveness of MAD in providing investors with more reliable recommendations and in 
curbing conflicts of interest, we examine the impact of MAD on the distribution of recommendations. In 
this section, we present the hypotheses, the research design, and the results related to the shift in the 
distribution of recommendations.  
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5.1. Hypotheses 
MAD provisions that aim at improving the fair presentation of recommendations should lead to a 
decline in the number of uninformative optimistic recommendations
7
. Hence, the first research question is 
whether the adoption of MAD changed the distribution of recommendations or not. Thus, we state our 
first hypothesis as follows. 
Ha1: The proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations decreased (increased) after the 
adoption of MAD. 
Because of MAD provisions on conflicts of interest, brokers facing such conflicts should experience a 
drift towards a smaller proportion of favorable recommendations. In order to examine whether the 
disclosure of potential conflicts modified the distribution of recommendations, we set our third hypothesis 
as follows. 
Ha2: The decrease (increase) in the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations following 
the adoption of MAD is higher for financial institutions having conflicts of interest. 
Finally, as Fang and Yasuda (2006) argue, analyst reputation is a strong deterrent of conflicts of interest 
because financial analysts are inclined to preserve their human capital. Similarly, Ljunqvist et al. (2006) 
show that investment banks with strong reputation at stake are less prone to issue optimistic 
recommendations. On this subject, Mehran and Stulz (2007) conclude that greater reputation capital helps 
control conflicts of interest. Assuming that reputation has a moderating effect on conflicts of interest is 
equivalent to saying that financial institutions with a high reputation capital at stake are more reluctant to 
destroy it by issuing biased recommendations. Moreover, the disclosure of conflicts of interest should 
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restrain these financial institutions more strongly from issuing optimistic research because the reputational 
cost of issuing misleading recommendations is higher for them. This leads to our fourth hypothesis. 
Ha3: The proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations was lower (higher) pre-MAD for 
financial institutions with a high reputation capital at stake, and the decrease (increase) in this proportion 
was higher post-MAD. 
5.2. Research design and variables 
In order to analyze the impact of MAD on the distribution of recommendations, we test whether the 
proportions of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations changed post-MAD. The variables of interest are 
defined as follows. 
5.2.1. Recommendations 
Recommendations are coded using a number between 1 and 5 (“Strong Buy” = 5 to “Strong Sell” = 1). 
As in previous studies, we reversed the scale used by I/B/E/S/ in order to have positive (negative) values 
for upgrades (downgrades). Then, we assign recommendations in three groups: favorable (“Strong Buy” 
and “Strong Sell”), neutral and unfavorable (“Strong Sell” and “Sell”). While I/B/E/S splits 
recommendations into five categories, some financial institutions use a three or four category rating scale. 
In addition, limiting the number of categories makes interpretation easier. 
5.2.2. Adoption of the Directive 
As Mulherin (2007, p. 424) mentions “ a thornier issue in implementing regulatory event studies is that 
regulatory change occurs via a lengthy and uncertain process making it difficult to pinpoint when the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
7
 It is unclear whether anti-selective disclosure should impact, or not, the distribution of recommendations. We examine this 
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market responds to the new regulation”. MAD is no exception with respect to this issue. The whole 
process was initiated by the adoption of codes of ethics at the national and international levels and then by 
the adoption of equivalent regulations in the US.  This was followed by Commission Directives and, 
eventually, by the transposition of these directives into national laws. However, our goal being to test 
whether the regulation had a permanent effect, the exact date is not critical. Since penalties incurred for 
violations of the law are country specific, we retain the specific date at which the corresponding law was 
enacted in each country as the relevant date. This choice is conservative (i.e., it makes it more difficult to 
detect the effect of the law) because financial institutions could have decided, on their own, to comply 
with MAD before its adoption by the corresponding Member State. To measure the change in the 
regulation induced by MAD, we define a dummy variable, ,j tPostLaw , equal to one (zero) if the 
recommendation was issued after (before) the adoption of the law in the country where the recommended 
firm j is listed. 
5.2.3. Public Enforcement 
The measure of public enforcement is adapted from La Porta et al. (2006). We use the variable “Public 
Enforcement” ( ),j tPubEnf as a proxy for the effectiveness of the national regulation under which the 
recommended firm j is listed.  This variable is designed to proxy for the role of the agencies in charge of 
supervising the national stock exchanges (Supervisor) and the sanctions incurred when the law is violated. 
In this study, we use the three sub-indexes defined by La Porta et al. (2006, p. 11) concerning the role of 
the Supervisor. Two additional sub-indexes are defined to proxy for the administrative and the criminal 
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sanctions in case of violation of the law.  ( ),j tPubEnf  is the arithmetic mean of these five sub-indexes. It 
aims at measuring the distance prevailing between national regulations; see Appendix 1. 
5.2.4. Conflicts of interest 
Our first measure of conflicts of interest is dictated by the provisions of MAD. Accordingly, 
underwriters or advisors in M&As issuing recommendations on firms they had business with over the past 
twelve months are classified as having a conflict of interest when they recommend these stocks 
(CD2003/125, Art. 6, al. 1d). Consequently, we use a dummy variable , ,b j tCMAD  which is equal to one for 
recommendations under “C”onflict (as defined by “MAD”) and zero otherwise. Hereafter, we label 
“Underwriters” the financial institutions that have advised M&As or underwritten securities of a firm they 
recommend over the twelve months preceding the recommendation issue. We find 4601 recommendations 
potentially affected by conflicts of interest as defined by MAD (CMAD=1). This number is surprisingly 
small since it represents 1.84% of the recommendations issued over our sample period. It shows that the 
law was extremely conservative in defining conflicts arising from investment banking activities. 
Monetary incentives go beyond current business. As explained in Section 3.2, increasing market share 
in the investment banking market could also motivate optimistic recommendations. Hence, all investment 
banks can be suspected of issuing overly optimistic recommendations, even though they have no current 
business relationship with the firm they recommend. Therefore, we also use a less restrictive measure of 
conflict of interest inspired from Cowen et al. (2006). A broker is classified as having a conflict of interest 
if he has had investment banking business8 over the past twelve months; hereafter, we will refer to these 
brokers as “Investment Banks”. The remaining firms are refered to as “Pure Brokers” since there are no 
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independent analyst firms in our sample. Following this definition, we construct a dummy variable 
,b tCIB  
equal to one for Investment Banks and zero otherwise. Note that our measure is not forward looking since 
the classification of a broker is known at the time the recommendation is issued. 
5.2.5. Reputation 
Our proxy for reputation is similar to Ljunqvist et al. (2006). Every year, we rank underwriters based 
on the proceeds of IPO/SEOs and bond issues and we rank advisors in M&As based on the value of the 
merger or acquisition. To be classified as having a high reputation, investment banks has to appear in the 
first decile of at least one of these three groups. We define the variable ,b tRep  (for reputation) as a dummy 
variable equal to one if the recommendation emanates from an investment bank with a high reputation and 
zero otherwise. The sample contains 54325 recommendations issued by high reputation investment banks. 
5.3. Shift in the distribution of recommendations levels 
Table 2 reports the results for our hypotheses related to the distribution drift of recommendations. 
Insert <Table 2> about here 
Our first hypothesis states that the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations decreased 
(increased) after MAD was passed. Table 2, Panel A, reports unconditional proportions pre-MAD and 
post-MAD. The proportion of “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations decreased by 1.19% from 
47.22% to 46.03% (z-stat = -4.89, significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level) after MAD was 
passed. Similarly, the proportion of “Sell” and “Strong Sell” recommendations increased by a mere 0.51% 
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 Banks acting only as managers or co-managers are extremely rare in Europe. 
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from 18.12% to 18.65% (z-stat = 2.71, significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level). Thus, we do 
not reject Ha1
9
. 
Our second hypothesis relates the distribution of recommendations to public enforcement. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we built three country groups using
,j tPubEnf
10. Results in Table 2, Panel B shows 
that the proportion of favorable recommendations dropped by 3.27% (z-stat = -6.02, significantly different 
from 0 at the 1 percent level) in countries with a high level of enforcement. In the remaining countries, 
this change was insignificant. Note also that proportions of favorable recommendations across groups 
converged post-MAD (High = 46.63%, Medium = 46.43%, Low = 44.38%). The proportion of 
unfavorable recommendations did not change significantly in countries with high protection.  Consistent 
with the idea that recommendations were less optimistic in countries with low investor protection because 
of reputation, the proportion of unfavorable recommendations decreased (significant at the 5.2 percent 
level) post-MAD. However, this proportion increased from 20.33% to 22.03% (z-stat = 2.35 significantly 
different from 0 at the 5 percent level) in countries with a medium level of enforcement, a fact that is 
difficult to reconcile with existing theories. 
Our third hypothesis states that the decrease (increase) in the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations following the adoption of MAD is higher for financial institutions facing conflicts of 
interest. Results reported in Table 2, Panel C are consistent with this hypothesis. The decrease was 
                                                 
9
 The decrease in favourable recommendations (60% vs 43.30%) and the increase in unfavourable recommendations (4.50% vs 
12.10%) were more pronounced in the US. This data are extrapolated from Ertimur et al. (2007, p. 592, Table 3). Their 
sample period contains recommendations for the years 1993-2004 excluding those issued between October 23
rd
,2003 and May 
9
th
, 2002. 
10
 Countries with a high level of enforcement include France and Great Britain. Countries with a medium level of enforcement 
include Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, while countries with a low level of enforcement include Austria, 
Belgium and Germany. 
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dramatic (-6.76% from 62.07% to 55.31%) for financial institutions potentially affected by conflicts of 
interest as defined by MAD (CMAD = 1). Interestingly, the proportion of favorable recommendations 
issued by financial institutions not affected by conflicts of interest (CMAD = 0) also decreased 
significantly post-MAD, but to a lesser extent (-1.13%). The broader definition of conflicts of interest 
provides another interesting perspective. While the proportion of unfavorable recommendations issued by 
brokers affected by conflicts (CIB = 1) decreased significantly by 1.78% from 48.57% to 46.79%, the 
proportion of favorable recommendations of those unaffected did not significantly change. Concerning 
unfavorable recommendations, the adoption of MAD did not change the proportion of unfavorable 
recommendations significantly, at the 1 percent level (the change is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level for CIB = 0), either for recommendations potentially affected by conflicts or not. When we 
examine Table 2, Panel C, in cross-section, we observe a higher (lower) proportion of positive (negative) 
recommendations for both underwriters and investment banks pre-MAD, which signals potential conflicts 
of interest. This proportion decreased (increased) significantly post-MAD. Based on all these results, we 
do not reject Ha3 for favorable recommendations. 
Consistent with Ha4, results in Table 2, Panel D show that the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations decreased (increased) significantly at the 1 percent level by 6.33% (2.54%) for financial 
institutions with high a reputation. This proportion did not change significantly for institutions with low 
reputation. The role of reputation was clearly exacerbated post-MAD. However, there are fewer negative 
recommendations for these financial institutions both pre-MAD and post-MAD.  
To summarize, the proportion of positive recommendations has decreased since the adoption of MAD. 
The drop was more pronounced for financial institutions exposed to conflicts of interest and for those with 
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a high reputation capital at stake. Since the adoption of MAD, institutions with a high reputation capital at 
stake became highly selective. Only 38 percent of firms they recommended obtained a favorable rating as 
opposed to 48 percent overall favorable ratings coming from the institutions with no reputation at stake. 
Following the adoption of MAD, the proportion of negative recommendations has increased significantly 
but only slightly. This result is essentially driven by institutions with high reputation at stake.  Disclosure 
of sources of potential conflicts of interest did not affect the proportion of unfavorable opinion. Overall, 
our results suggest that MAD reduced the gap between the proportion of favorable and unfavorable 
recommendations, but it did not completely eliminate it11. Yet to be examined is how the changes in the 
distribution of recommendations translated in terms of stock price reaction.  
6. Did MAD change the stock price reaction to recommendations?  
In this section, we develop hypotheses that closely parallel those related to the shift in the distribution 
of recommendations. We present the research design, descriptive statistics concerning revision of 
recommendations and the results related to the stock price impact of recommendations under both 
regulatory regimes. 
6.1. Hypotheses 
The elimination or the decrease in the number of unduly optimistic recommendations resulting from the 
adoption of MAD should restore trust, which in turn should translate into higher stock price revisions. In 
contrast, more frequent “Negative initiations” and “Downward” revisions should have a smaller impact on 
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 This gap could be due to the characteristics of firms using the services of highly reputed banks, which could have better future 
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stock prices of recommended firms. Reiterations of previous opinions should not affect prices significantly 
either pre- or post-MAD because they are not informative; see Womack (1996) and Clement and Tse 
(2005) among others. The corresponding hypothesis is expressed as follows. 
Hb1: Abnormal returns associated with post-MAD upgrades and positive initiations (downgrades and 
negative initiations) are higher (less negative) than abnormal returns associated with pre-MAD similar 
recommendations.  
A higher investor protection should translate into higher stock price reactions because financial 
institutions bear higher costs for misleading recommendations. 
Hb2: Abnormal returns associated with pre-MAD upgrades and positives initiations (downgrades and 
negative initiations) are positively related to the level of investor protection. 
The assumption underlying the adoption of MAD is that investors take all recommendations for 
granted. If investors were not aware of conflicts of interest pre-MAD, the stock price reaction to 
recommendations should be the same regardless of the issuer. This pattern should not change post-MAD 
since sources of potential conflicts are disclosed and misleading recommendations are under the scope of 
the regulation. However, if investors discounted misleading recommendations appropriately, they were not 
necessarily penalized prior to the adoption of MAD. In this setting, before MAD, we should not notice any 
difference in stock price reactions resulting from recommendations affected by conflicts or from those that 
are not. In the aftermath of MAD, as there is no need to discount recommendations, we should observe 
stronger stock price reactions for recommendations potentially affected by conflicts of interest. 
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Hb3: Abnormal returns associated with favorable recommendations affected by conflicts of interest are 
higher post-MAD.  
Since MAD was expected to reduce the risk of issuing optimistic recommendations, the comparative 
advantage of financial institutions with high reputation capital at stake should decrease post-MAD.  
Hb4: Abnormal returns associated with upgrades and positive initiations (downgrades and negative 
initiations) emanating from highly reputed financial institutions are lower post-MAD.  
6.2. Research design 
In order to assess whether the adoption of MAD modified how investors interpret recommendations, 
we estimate Cumulative Abnormal Returns over a three-day period surrounding recommendation releases 
with the Market Model
12
; see Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Salva and Sonney (2006) and Kadan, 
Madureira, Wang and Zack (2007) among others. 
We estimate the following model to explain CARs: 
, , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 ,
5 , , , 6 , ,
, ,
b j t j t j t b j t b t
j t b j t j t b t
b j t
CAR a a PostLaw a PubEnf a Conflicts a Rep
a PostLaw Conflicts a PostLaw Rep
ε
= + + +
+ × + ×
′+ × +b,j,t
+
c Control Var
 
where PostLaw, PubEnf, Conflicts and Rep are the four dummies defined in the previous section. In 
addition to the variables of interest, the model includes the interactions of PostLaw with Conflicts and 
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 The parameters are estimated over [ ]250, 11− −  and corrected for infrequent trading as in Maynes and Rumsey (1993). 
According to Datastream conventions and following Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), we define a stock price as missing 
if the following conditions are fulfilled: a) the current stock price is equal to its previous value, b) trading volume is nil and c) 
the current value of the market index is different from its previous value. Non-working days are days for which the stock index 
is equal to its previous value. Returns are computed over two consecutive working days with non missing prices. 
Recommendations with missing prices at the beginning or the end of the [-1, +1] period are excluded. 
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Rep13. We also introduce a set of control variables (ControlVar) aimed at measuring the quantity 
(“surprise”) and the quality of information contained in recommendations. We also control for differences 
in the firm informational environment; see Gleason and Lee (2003), Ertimur et al. (2007) and Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2007) among others. 
6.3. Control variables
14
 
6.3.1. Quantity of information 
We estimate the innovation conveyed by a recommendation as the spread of the current recommendation 
from its consensus, Dcons. The consensus is the average of the last recommendations issued by analysts. 
In order to incorporate recent information only, we eliminate recommendations older than six months. 
Recommendations strongly departing from other analysts’ sentiment (consensus) are expected to bring 
more information to market participants relative to recommendations issued by analysts herding around 
the consensus; see Clement and Tse (2005) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2007). As these recommendations 
should induce a strong positive (negative) stock price reaction for upgrades (downgrades) and positive 
(negative) initiations15, we expect a positive (negative) association between Dcons and CAR. 
A recommendation closely following a similar recommendation issued by another analyst should have 
a lower impact since its informational content was already, at least partially, incorporated into stock 
prices. We measure the timeliness of a recommendation using the number of recommendations for the 
                                                 
13
 The interaction Conflicts with Rep is not included the cross-product of Conflicts and Rep is exactly equal to Rep; see the 
definition of these variables above. The interaction of PostLaw and PubEnf is not included either because after the adoption of 
MAD, the laws across EU are assumed to be closed.  
14
 The definition of the control variables is summarized in Appendix 2. 
15
 As the explanatory variables are expected to have reverse signs for downgrades versus upgrades, we focus on upgrades and 
positive initiations only.  
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same stock issued during the ten-day period preceding the recommendation. We expect a positive 
(negative) association between this variable, labeled Follow, and CAR. 
6.3.2. Information quality 
Large financial institutions have more resources to support research. This should contribute to more 
accurate forecasts and valuable recommendations; see Stickel (1995) and Clement (1999). Furthermore, 
large institutions hire skilled analysts which are less prone to herd; see Fang and Yasuda (2006). We rank 
financial institutions based on the number of recommendations they issued over the previous year. We 
define a dummy variable, ,kerb tBigBro
16
, equal to one if the financial institution is in the first decile and 
zero otherwise. This variable is expected to be positively related to CAR. 
A recommendation with a companion earnings forecast revision is likely to be more informative since 
it allows investors to infer the magnitude of the expected stock price revision. We measure the reliability 
of the recommendation, , ,b j tRel , using a dummy variable equal to one if an annual earnings forecast was 
issued by the same analyst during the ten-day period surrounding the recommendation and zero otherwise. 
Consequently, we expect a positive (negative) association between Rel and CAR for upgrades or positive 
initiations (downgrades or negative initiations). 
6.3.3. Information environment 
The information flow increases monotonically with the number of financial institutions following the 
firm; see Ertimur et al. (2007). The speed at which information is incorporated into stock prices is also 
positively related to analyst coverage; see Brennan, Chordia and Swaminathan (1993). Therefore, the 
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 Previous research defines use the number of analysts employed by the broker. This measure is unavailable in our study 
because there are Teams which number of analysts is not reported in I/B/E/S 
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stock price reaction to a new recommendation should be inversely related to the number of financial 
institutions covering the firm. Hence, we expect a negative (positive) relation between CAR and coverage 
for upgrades (downgrades). We measure coverage with a Log transformation of the number of financial 
institutions having released recommendations on firm j over the six-month period preceding the current 
recommendation. 
Earnings announcement released during, or close to, the event window may induce analysts to revise 
their recommendations. In that setting, the causality between the recommendation and the stock price 
change does not result from gathering and processing independent information. We control for this 
spurious causality using a dummy variable, ,j tCER , equal to one if the recommendation is 
“C”ontemporaneous to an “E”arnings “R”elease within the event window; see Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 
(2004), Boni and Womack (2006) and Sonney and Salva (2006). As upgrades (downgrades) occur mainly 
after positive (negative) earnings surprises, we expect a positive (negative) association between CER and 
CAR. 
6.4. Descriptive statistics 
6.4.1. Initiations, reiterations and revisions 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of initiations, re-iterations, upgrades and downgrades and sub-totals 
sorted by year. As already mentioned, there is no clear break point in the structure of recommendations. 
Positive initiations represent 55 percent of initiations, while positive reiterations represent 48 percent of 
reiterations. Initiations dropped by 6.34 percent from 18.85 percent to 12.52 percent (z-stat = -34.11, 
significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level). The requirement to announce when brokers decide to 
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stop coverage could explain this decrease (CD2003/125/EC, Article 4.1.d). However, we cannot rule out 
two alternative explanations. The first possibility is that this drop could be related to the decrease in the 
number of IPOs in the aftermath of the “Internet Bubble”. The second possibility relates to the re-
organization of brokerage houses in Europe in the late nineties. During that period, financial institutions 
that had historically concentrated on their national markets initiated a more systematic coverage of all 
European firms. The result was an unusual number of initiations; see Sonney (2007). 
Insert <Table 3> about here 
In order to study whether recommendations are more informative under the new regulatory regime, we 
made a pre- and post-MAD comparison of the frequency of re-iterations and of recommendations issued 
simultaneously with an earnings forecast
17
. Consistent with more informative recommendations and 
effective anti-disclosure provisions, the proportion of re-iterations decreased by 2.47% from 20.73% to 
18.25% (z-stat = -12.60, significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level), while the proportion of 
contemporaneous recommendations increased by 0.62% (from 11.56% to 12.18%; z-stat = 3.95, 
significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level) after MAD was passed. However, the proportion of 
recommendations that were not accompanied by an earnings forecast did not change significantly (8.20% 
pre-MAD and 8.31% post-MAD, not statistically different at the 5 percent level).  
6.4.2 Cumulated abnormal returns around recommendations (CARs) 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of CARs. They are split by type of recommendations and by pre-
MAD vs. post-MAD sub-periods. We first examine CARs that are statistically significant both pre-MAD 
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 We use a ten-day period around the publication of the recommendation to determine whether the recommendation was 
accompanied by an earnings forecast or not.  
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and post-MAD.  Abnormal stock price reactions to positive initiations and upgrades are higher and 
significantly more pronounced in the post-MAD period. Interestingly, stock price reaction to downgrades 
is also significantly stronger during the post-MAD period. Stock price reaction to neutral initiations, which 
was significantly negative pre-MAD, is no longer significant post-MAD. This result suggests that MAD 
rendered these recommendations more understandable. Stock price responses to negative reiterations are 
insignificant both before and after the adoption of MAD. However, the difference between them is 
marginally significant at the 5 percent level. The remaining CARs are not significantly different from 0 at 
the same level. 
Insert <Table 4> about here 
These preliminary results are consistent with hypothesis Hb1 which states that favorable 
recommendations should have higher returns in the post-MAD period. Returns associated with negative 
initiations are not statistically different across periods. However, returns associated with downgrades are 
significantly lower in the post-MAD period.  This confirms our hypothesis that the impact of unfavorable 
recommendations decreases with increased reporting frequency. Note also that the CARs in this study are 
significantly higher than those reported in Jegadeesh and Kim (2004) for France, Great Britain, Germany 
and Italy. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that we retain the day before recommendation 
release in the computation of CARs and, more importantly, by our more recent sample period (1997 to 
2006), which includes the effects of MAD. 
Dubois-Dumontier - Regulating the Financial Analysis Industry:  Is the European Directive Effective? 
 30 
6.5. The impact of MAD on stock price reactions to recommendations 
6.5.1. Main results 
Since abnormal returns induced by upgrades, positive initiations and downgrades are highly significant 
and exhibit significant differences pre-MAD and post-MAD, we restrict our analysis to these 
recommendations
18
. 
Insert <Table 5> about here 
In Table 5, we first examine how stock price response to recommendations changed after MAD. 
Consistent with our hypothesis Hb1, we find that the adoption of MAD had a strong positive (negative) 
impact on upgrades and positive initiations (downgrades). The impact of MAD on abnormal returns comes 
to 0.37% or 0.45% depending on the type of conflict of interest under consideration (CMAD or CIB). It is 
both statistically and economically highly significant. 
We turn our attention to cross-border investor protection and its impact on stock market reactions to 
recommendations. The coefficient of PubEnf is significant at the 1 percent level for upgrades and for both 
measures of conflicts (Hb2). An increase of 50 basis points in PubEnf (corresponding to the difference 
between Great Britain (highest) and Austria (lowest)) results in an increase in CAR of 0.13 percent. For 
positive initiations, the impact of PubEnf is of a similar magnitude and is (not) significant at the 5 percent 
level for CIB (CMAD). For downgrades, PubEnf is never significant at the usual levels. Jegadeesh and 
Kim (2006) attribute the differences in stock price reactions to recommendations between the US and four 
EC countries (France, Germany, Italy and UK) to US analyst skills. Our results show that investor 
protection explains, at least partly, these differences. 
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A significant part of MAD (CD125/2003/EC) was dedicated to curbing conflicts of interest. Our results 
show that conflicts (CMAD/CIB) did not have an impact on CARs associated with upgrades before MAD, 
leaving us with the following options. Either investors were completely unaware of conflicts or they 
discounted recommendations appropriately. Since the market reaction to upgrades is positive and 
significant (at the 5 percent level) post-MAD, we conclude that investors discounted pre-MAD 
recommendations issued by investment banks. However, this result does not hold for underwriters. 
Investors reacted negatively pre-MAD, and still react negatively post-MAD (one-side tests are significant 
at the 5 percent level) to downgrades that are potentially affected by conflicts, showing that they interpret 
these recommendations as “very bad” news. This result is also consistent with the idea that investors know 
and understand that investment banks and underwriters have no interest is releasing downgrades. 
The last hypothesis (Hb4) concerns reputation (Rep). The corresponding coefficients are all significant 
at the 1 percent level. Investors give more value to recommendations issued by investment banks with a 
high reputation at stake indicating that investors are well aware of potential conflicts. As expected, the 
adoption of MAD reduced the comparative advantage of financial institutions with high reputations. 
CARs associated with downgrades (upgrades) are significantly less negative (positive) at the 5 percent 
level and are statistically insignificant at the same level. Concerning positive initiations, reputation has a 
positive impact (significant at the 5 percent level with CMAD, insignificant with CIB), which contradicts 
our hypothesis. 
The control variables provide some interesting and new insights into European Markets. Empirical 
evidence in Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) suggests that European markets react less to recommendations than 
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 Results for reiterations and for neutral and negative recommendations are available upon request. 
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US markets. We find that CARs in Europe, albeit smaller than their US counterparts, are explained by 
similar variables. These variables are all highly significant (at the 1 percent level) for both upgrades and 
downgrades. They all have the expected sign. Moreover, they are insensitive to the definition of conflict 
on interest.  
6.5.2 Robustness check 
As already explained, there are at least two other dates to consider with regard to the adoption of MAD. 
The first date is the adoption of the Commission Directives (December 23
rd
, 2003) and the second date is 
the deadline by which EC countries had to transpose MAD into their national laws (October 12th, 2004). In 
order to check the robustness of our results with respect to these dates, we define two dummy variables.  
These are respectively equal to one after the adoption of the Commission Directive (PostEC) and after the 
transposition deadline (PostDL), and zero otherwise.  Based on the variables PostLaw, PostEC and 
PostDL, we define three non-nested models. We compare these models using the Davidson and 
McKinnon (1981) procedure. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Insert <Table 6> about here 
No model clearly dominates in all aspects. In particular, the model with PostEC has additional 
explanatory power compared to the one with PostLaw, and vice-versa. In other words, CARs changed 
prior to the transposition of MAD into national law(s). There are several reasons for that. First, some 
brokers could have decided to adopt the provisions of MAD as soon as the law was passed in their own 
country. Others could have adopted these provisions as soon as they were made public, notably because 
some provisions were already part of codes of ethics issued by professional associations. Finally, the US 
regulation could have spilled-over into the EC (see below). All these models provide similar results in 
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term of significance of the explanatory variables, confirming the robustness of our results. The model 
initially estimated with PostLaw has extra explanatory power as compared to the ones based on PostEC 
and PostDL.  
6.6. Why did abnormal returns increase after all? 
As shown in Section 3.1., RegFD induced no global change in US stock price reactions to 
recommendations. However, as already mentioned, the corresponding provisions of MAD 
(CD124/2003/EC) could have had a negative impact on recommendations issued by underwriters who had 
insider knowledge of the firms; see Cornett et al. (2007). These financial institutions are more exposed 
than others to a loss of their informational advantage for at least two reasons.  First, the adoption of MAD 
led the Management of recommended firms to eliminate selective disclosures. Second, reorganization of 
their financial research and investment banking departments made obtaining private information difficult 
(Chinese wall). Therefore, positive recommendations and upgrades issued by financial institutions with 
investment banking ties with the recommended firm are expected to convey less private information post-
MAD and, consequently, the stock price reaction should be lower. 
To check this hypothesis, we estimate our model for the sub-set of favorable recommendations (“Buy”, 
“Strong Buy” and upgrades) issued by financial institutions exposed to conflicts of interest as defined by 
the provisions of MAD (CMAD = 1). The sum of the coefficients (similar to previous hypothesis H1b) is 
0.23 percent (t-stat = 0.46) for upgrades, 0.11 percent (t-stat = 0.37) for positive initiations and 0.43 
percent (t-stat = 0.39) for positive reiterations. All the coefficients being statistically insignificant, we 
reject this hypothesis. Therefore, given results in section 6.3.1., it appears that two main factors caused the 
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change in CARs. First, conflicts of interest, if not completely curbed by MAD, were reduced. Second, the 
fair presentation of recommendations, which is almost costless to implement, played also a role. 
7. US regulation spill-over onto EC recommendations 
The third question addressed in this research is whether the adoption of MAD was really necessary 
insofar as a similar regulation had been adopted more than two years earlier in the US.  
7.1. Hypotheses 
Until now, we have assumed that recommendations are only influenced by the regulations of the 
country in which recommended stocks are listed. Implicitly, this is equivalent to assuming that national 
regulations are only oriented toward local markets. However, European banks that have important stakes 
in the US19, as well as US banks following European firms, do not restrict the diffusion of their reports to 
EC countries. US and European financial institutions with their headquarters, a branch, a subsidiary or that 
simply do business in the US (hereafter global banks), must comply with US regulations when they release 
reports directed toward US investors20; see Becker, Yim and Greenawalt (1999).  These financial 
institutions do not consider the nationality of the recommended firm or of the potential recipients of their 
analysts’ reports.  These analysts’ reports reflect regulatory changes as soon as they are adopted, and thus 
we hypothesize that US regulations immediately affect recommendations on stocks listed on EC markets.  
                                                 
19
 Deutsche Bank was part of the Global Research Settlement. 
20
 Anecdotal evidence shows that recommendations sent to costumers on a regular basis included information on conflicts of 
interest well before the CD 2003/125/EC was passed. Recommendations of non-US stocks released by UBS for US costumers 
mentioned investment banking business as soon as the second semester of 2002. Société Générale released these conflicts as 
early as the beginning of 2003. 
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In order to analyze whether the US regulations devoted to anti-selective disclosure and analysts’ 
conflicts of interest spilled over on to recommendations issued by global banks on European firms, we 
restrict our analysis to two sub-periods. The pre-US regulation period begins on January 1
st
, 1998 and ends 
with the adoption of RegFD on October 23
rd
, 2000. The post-US regulation period begins with the 
adoption of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 of November 6th, 2002. It ends on December 23rd, 
2003 with the adoption of CD 2003/124/EC and CD 2003/125/EC. The intervening period is excluded 
from our analysis since, as Ertimur et al. (2007, p. 582) argue, “it represents a transition period in terms of 
information environment and is characterized by market-wide volatility”. Thus, if the US regulation had 
any effect, we should observe a difference in the distribution of recommendations and in abnormal returns 
associated with these recommendations when comparing the two sub-periods and focusing on financial 
institutions operating both in the US and in the EC. We express our set of hypotheses as follows. 
Hc1: The proportion of positive (negative) recommendations on EC stocks issued by global banks did 
not change after the adoption of the US regulations. 
Hc2: Abnormal returns associated with upward (downward) revisions on EC stocks issued by global 
banks did not change after the adoption of the US regulations. 
7.2 Results 
We first examine the change in the distribution of recommendations to determine how global banks 
reacted to the adoption of the US regulations. We observe a dramatic drop in the proportion of positive 
recommendations from 51.57 percent to 40.95 percent (z-stat = -28.43) and an increase of similar 
magnitude in the proportion of negative recommendations from 13.53 percent to 22.23 percent 
(z-stat = 30.99) for the sub-sample of global banks. For the remaining local banks, not directly concerned 
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by the US regulations, the magnitude of the drop (increase) is smaller but, nevertheless, also significant. 
The proportion of positive recommendations dropped from 49.06 percent to 46.22 percent (z-stat = -5.33) 
and the proportion of negative recommendations increased from 16.77 percent to 21.76 percent 
(z-stat =12.02). Therefore, we strongly reject Hc1 at the usual level of confidence. The decrease (increase) 
in positive (negative) recommendations shows that all financial institutions and more specifically those 
that had to comply with the US regulations changed the distribution of their recommendations on EC 
stocks after the adoption of these regulations. Because of the spill-over of the US regulations, changes in 
European recommendations materialized well before the adoption of the EC Commission Directives. 
The remaining question is whether and how investors interpreted these significant changes in the 
distribution of recommendations. In response, we estimate a model similar to the previous one. However, 
four differences are noteworthy. First, we restrict our sample period to the pre- and post-US regulation 
periods. Second, we examine separately the sample of “Global Banks” that had to comply with the US 
regulations from those that did not (i.e. “Local Banks”). Third, we do not control for conflicts of interest 
and reputation since our investigation is limited to the impact of the US regulation on European 
recommendations. Fourth, and most importantly, we do not include a variable capturing differences in 
terms of enforcement between countries since we focus only on the US regulation. 
We estimate the following model:  
, , 0 1 , ,Reb j t t b j tCAR a a PostUS g ε′= + × +b,j,t+ c Control Var  
PostUSReg is a dummy variable equal to one for recommendations issued between November 6th, 2002 
and December 23
rd
, 2003, and is zero otherwise. The null hypothesis is that the US regulations had no 
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effect on recommendations issued on EC stocks. Table 7 reports the coefficients and the corresponding t-
stats. 
Insert <Table 7> about here 
Hc2 is neither rejected for upgrades nor for downgrades issued by global banks. Concerning “positive 
initiations”, and contrary to our hypothesis, the coefficient associated with PostUSReg is negative. It is 
possible that this finding is sample specific given the poor performance of European stock markets and the 
low number of IPOs that took place during that period.   
In counterpoint, local banks constitute an interesting case study since they are not directly concerned by 
the US regulations under consideration. As expected, we do not find any significant change in the stock 
price reaction to upgrades and positive initiations. However, the coefficient of PostUSReg is positive and 
significant at the one percent level for downgrades.  The market reaction to downgrades issued by local 
banks is less negative than reactions prior to the adoption of the US regulations. Negative 
recommendations could have been perceived less negatively during that period (bear market), in particular 
if local banks were late in incorporating bad news already known by market participants. 
To summarize, we find strong evidence that financial institutions reduced (increased) the proportion of 
favorable (unfavorable) recommendations after the US regulations were passed. Nevertheless, investors 
did not react significantly to these changes until MAD was adopted. Consistent with improved investor 
protection that accompanied  the adoption of MAD, CARs did not change systematically until the law was 
passed. Thus, we conclude that the US regulations did not completely spill over into the European stock 
markets.  
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8. Conclusion 
Since 2000, new regulations aimed at curbing selective disclosure and conflicts of interest in the 
financial analyst profession have been adopted in the US. Similar regulations, known as MAD, were 
passed in the EC. The empirical evidence reported in this paper is in sharp contrast with previous 
literature. While the distribution of US recommendations changed dramatically following the adoption of 
the US regulations, we document a smaller impact  on the distribution of EC recommendations after the 
adoption of MAD.  
These findings raise the following question: Was the EC regulation necessary and/or effective? 
To answer this question, we examined the impact of MAD on the distribution of recommendations and 
stock price reactions following recommendation releases, controlling for the nature of conflicts of interest 
and the intensity of investor protection.  
We used two definitions of conflicts of interest. First, following MAD, a recommendation was said to 
be at risk of conflicts if it was issued by a financial institution that had business ties with the 
recommended firm during the previous twelve months. Under this definition, recommendations potentially 
affected by conflicts of interest represented less than 2% of the total.  Second, we used a more 
conventional definition of conflicts. Under this definition, a recommendation suffers from a potential 
conflict of interest if it is issued by a financial institution with investment banking business during the 
previous year, independent of the firms concerned by the recommendation. Using the second definition, 
the proportion of conflicted recommendations increases dramatically to more than 60% of the total.  This 
figure is more in line with what was observed in the US at 80% of the total. The shape of the distribution 
changed post-MAD since positive recommendations became less frequent. 
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Concerning market reaction to recommendations, we analyzed revisions and initiations, since both of 
these are expected to convey more information than mere reiterations. We found that MAD had a 
significant impact on positive upgrades, which suggests that the adoption of MAD increased upgrade 
recommendation credibility for investors. Interestingly, this effect did not result in less credible 
downgrades.  In fact, the introduction of MAD has had a negative impact on stock price reactions to 
downgrades, suggesting increased credibility. 
Differences in investor protection, as defined by La Porta et al. (2006), are also highly significant. 
Securities laws were at very different developmental levels within the EC prior to the adoption of MAD.  
After MAD these differences were greatly diminished. Our findings show that investor protection is an 
important determinant of stock price reaction to recommendations. They also show that investors react 
more strongly to recommendations when potential conflicts of interest related to investment banking 
business are revealed. Furthermore, reputation acts as a strong deterrent of conflicts and the adoption of 
regulations had no impact on it. 
Finally, we examined whether the US regulation spilled over into the EC, making the EC directive 
redundant. Our results show that financial institutions dramatically changed the distribution of their 
recommendations (fewer positive recommendations and more negative recommendations) following the 
adoption of the US regulations. However, investors reacted to this change only after MAD was adopted. 
Therefore, MAD was legitimate, not because it changed analysts’ behavior but because it reassured 
investors that the law was enforceable.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of recommendations 
This table reports summary statistics of recommendations issued by brokers over the 1998-2007 period. Panel A (B) reports the 
information sorted by country (year). Column 1 and column 2 indicate the number of firms by country (year), respectively 
brokers, that appeared in the sample. Column 3 show the number of recommendations by country (year). Columns 4 to 8 show 
the number of recommendations by level (Strong Buy, Buy, Neutral, Sell, Strong Sell).  
 
Panel A: by country 
   Recommendations 
Country Firms Brokers Total Strong Sell Sell Neutral Buy Strong Buy 
Austria 111 16 2612 80 237 1103 687 505 
Belgium 137 50 6728 256 834 2575 1913 1150 
Germany 666 143 36620 2195 4654 14137 9554 6080 
Denmark 159 62 6871 475 1243 1960 2140 1053 
Spain 147 52 14550 1013 2270 4551 4023 2693 
Finland 144 38 9768 498 2078 2586 3417 1189 
France 699 209 39584 1644 6154 11988 12250 7548 
UK 2119 536 75465 3713 7405 27469 22747 14131 
Ireland 82 7 2324 50 154 728 849 543 
Italy 282 67 15292 499 1822 6200 4589 2182 
Netherlands 219 113 20811 1284 2487 7922 5331 3787 
Portugal 64 37 3805 242 540 1229 1119 675 
Sweden 291 79 15172 898 2768 4422 4813 2271 
Total 5106 273 249602 12847 32646 86870 73432 43807 
Panel B: by year 
   Recommendations 
 Firms Brokers Total Strong Sell Sell Neutral Buy Strong Buy 
1998 2694 158 26352 1686 2807 9773 6913 5173 
1999 2750 160 25517 1221 2388 8690 7968 5250 
2000 2684 154 23762 852 2054 7707 8079 5070 
2001 2623 141 25349 1351 3260 8992 7365 4381 
2002 2374 135 29073 1374 4706 9594 9143 4256 
2003 2409 137 29810 1694 5058 10620 8640 3798 
2004 2458 157 25153 1282 3595 8567 7687 4022 
2005 2705 169 26036 1306 3757 9597 7127 4249 
2006 2821 169 27534 1418 3615 9556 7442 5503 
2007 2190 161 11016 663 1406 3774 3068 2105 
Total 5106 273 249602 12847 32646 86870 73432 43807 
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Table 2: MAD and the proportion of favorable and unfavorable recommendations  
This table reports the proportions (in %) of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations before and after the adoption of MAD, 
and the z-stat corresponding to the null of no change. Conditioning variables are investor’s protection (PubEnf) in Panel B, 
conflicts of interest in Panel C (CMAD equals 1 if broker “b” underwrote capital issuance from firm j during the last twelve 
months and 0 otherwise, and CIB that equals 1 if broker “b” was an investment bank over the past twelve months and 0 
otherwise) and reputation in Panel D (Rep is a dummy variable that equals 1 if broker “b” is ranked in the Top 10 decile of 
European investment banks). The change in the proportions (Diff.) is in bold (italics) when significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
Panel A: Unconditional change 
 Unfavorable Favorable 
Before 18.12 47.22 
After 18.63 46.03 
Diff. 0.51 -1.19 
z-stat 2.71 -4.89 
Panel B: Enforcement 
 Unfavorable Favorable 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Before 16.39 20.33 18.27 49.90 45.78 42.86 
After 16.67 22.03 17.16 46.63 46.43 44.38 
Diff. 0.29 1.70 -1.11 -3.27 0.66 1.53 
z-stat 0.43 2.35 -1.15 -6.02 1.08 1.95 
Panel C: Conflicts of interest 
 Unfavorable Favorable 
 CMAD = 0 CMAD = 1 Diff. z-stat CMAD = 0 CMAD = 1 Diff. z-stat 
Before 18.32 7.08 11.24 17.02 46.96 62.07 -15.12 -17.66 
After 18.84 8.87 9.98 8.55 45.83 55.31 -9.48 -6.35 
Diff. 0.53 1.79   -1.13 -6.76   
z-stat 1.19 0.57   -3.11 -3.05   
 CIB = 0 CIB = 1 Diff. z-stat CIB = 0 CIB = 1 Diff. z-stat 
Before 18.96 17.63 1.32 7.33 44.89 48.57 -3.68 -15.73 
After 20.53 16.96 3.56 10.53 45.17 46.79 -1.62 -3.74 
Diff. 1.57 -0.67   0.28 -1.78   
z-stat 2.42 -1.11   0.51 -3.71   
Panel D: Reputation 
 Unfavorable Favorable 
 Rep = 0 Rep = 1 Diff. z-stat Rep = 0 Rep = 1 Diff. z-stat 
Before 19.62 13.08 6.54 31.67 48.17 44.05 4.12 15.39 
After 19.26 15.62 3.64 8.14 47.76 37.72 10.04 17.53 
Diff. -0.36 2.54   -0.41 -6.33   
z-stat -0.75 2.52   -1.05 -6.94   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of initiations and revisions 
This table reports summary statistics of recommendations issued by brokers over the 1998-2007 period. Columns 1 to 8 indicate 
the number of recommendations corresponding to initiating coverage, re-iterations, upgrades, and downgrades. 
 
 Initiation Re-iteration Downgrades  Upgrades Total 
 Year Negative Neutral Positive   Negative Neutral Positive    
1998 1140 2956 4106 350 1076 1576 8043 7105 26352 
1999 751 1976 3572 404 1805 2296 6932 7781 25517 
2000 501 1416 3021 490 1892 3533 6848 6061 23762 
2001 728 1630 2546 505 1634 2903 9019 6384 25349 
2002 702 962 1811 1044 3069 3817 9393 8275 29073 
2003 671 1191 1899 1370 3331 2736 10215 8397 29810 
2004 588 1105 2243 765 1852 2249 8286 8065 25153 
2005 470 944 2015 941 2375 2167 8975 8149 26036 
2006 470 961 2241 675 1689 2086 9814 9598 27534 
2007 142 259 677 271 532 984 4255 3896 11016 
Total 6163 13400 24131 6815 19255 24347 81780 73711 249602 
Dubois-Dumontier - Regulating the Financial Analysis Industry:  Is the European Directive Effective? 
 49 
Table 4: Cumulated Abnormal Returns (in %) around initiations and revisions 
This table reports the Cumulated Abnormal Returns around initiations and revisions of recommendations from 1998 to 2007. 
CARs are computed over [-1; +1] using the market model which parameters are estimated over [-250; -11]. Column 2 (3) 
reports the CARs before (after) the adoption of MAD, Column 4 reports the difference between column 2 and column 3 and 
column 5 reports the t-stat corresponding to the null hypothesis of no difference between CARs pre and post MAD. Revisions 
issued contemporaneously are counted as one revision. Figures significant at the 1% (5%) level are in bold (italic) characters. 
 
 Pre-MAD Post-MAD Diff. t-stat 
1. Initiation     
• Negative -0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.02 
• Neutral -0.22 0.03 0.25 3.01 
• Positive 0.33 0.83 0.51 7.27 
     
2. Re-iteration     
• Negative -0.09 0.13 0.22 2.07 
• Neutral 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.99 
• Positive 0.06 0.17 0.11 1.93 
     
3. Downgrades -0.59 -0.84 -0.25 -6.25 
     
4. Upgrades 0.55 0.94 0.39 10.64 
Dubois-Dumontier - Regulating the Financial Analysis Industry:  Is the European Directive Effective? 
 50 
Table 5: Market reaction and the EU regulation 
This table reports the coefficients and the t-stats of Model 1 for upgrades, positive initiations. The model is: 
, , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , , , 6 , ,
1 , , 2 , , 3 , 4 , , 5 , 7 , , ,ker Re
b j t j t j t a j t a t j t b j t j t b t
b j t b j t b t b j t j t j t b j t
CAR a a PostLaw a PubEnf a Conflicts a Rep a PostLaw Conflicts a PostLaw Rep
c Dcons c Follow c BigBro c l c LnNbAn c CER ε
= + + + + × + ×
+ + + + + + +
+
CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return defined in Section 4.1. It measures the market reaction of broker’s b recommendation on firm j 
released at date t. PostLaw is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the transposition of CD2003/124 and CD2003/125 into 
national laws and 0 before. PubEnf measures the distance of public enforcement among regulations pre-MAD. Conflicts is a 
dummy variable that is measure in two different ways: a) CMAD that equals 1 if broker “b” underwrote capital issuance from 
firm j during the last twelve months and 0 otherwise, and b) CIB that equals 1 if broker “b” was an investment bank over the 
past twelve months and 0 otherwise. In Panel A (B), we report the results for CMAD (CIB). Rep is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if broker “b” is ranked in the Top 10 decile of European investment banks. Dcons is the spread of the current recommendation 
from the “consensus” defined as the average of the ratings of the recommendations issued over the last six months on firm j. 
Follow measures the numbers of recommendations issued by others analysts on the same firm during the ten-day period 
preceding the current recommendation. BigBroker is equal to 1 if the broker is in the first decile in terms of recommendations 
issued over the previous year. Rel is a dummy variable equal to 1 indicating whether an annual earnings forecast was issued 
revision the recommendation and 0 otherwise. LnNbAn is the logarithm of the numbers of analysts having issued 
recommendations over the last six months on firm j. CER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is 
issued contemporaneous to an earnings announcement. These variables are defined in Section 4.2.1. Coefficients significant at 
the 1% (5%) level are in bold (italics) and heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics are in parenthesis below. The adjusted-
R
2
, the Fisher statistics and the number of observations are indicated below. The last two rows report the value of reputation 
after MAD and the the t-stat under the null of no effect. 
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 CMAD CIB 
 Upgrade Positive init. Downgrade Upgrade Positive init. Downgrade 
C 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0039 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0036 
 1.97 0.99 -3.64 1.87 1.23 -3.30 
PostLaw 0.0045 0.0044 -0.0036 0.0037 0.0037 -0.0030 
 11.10 5.89 -8.44 7.12 3.83 -5.36 
PubEnf 0.0026 0.0032 -0.0009 0.0026 0.0035 -0.0008 
 2.94 1.82 -0.91 2.94 1.97 -0.76 
Conflicts 0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0062 0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0010 
 0.92 -0.64 -2.44 0.47 -1.59 -1.89 
Rep 0.0029 0.0027 -0.0030 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0031 
 5.25 2.23 -4.61 5.41 2.34 -4.72 
PostLaw*Conflicts -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0079 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0016 
 -0.99 -0.13 -1.69 2.03 0.95 -1.95 
PostLaw*Rep -0.0006 0.0048 0.0038 -0.0014 0.0041 0.0042 
 -0.67 2.22 3.78 -1.44 1.79 3.84 
Dcons 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0012 
 6.07 -1.15 4.99 6.04 -1.04 4.92 
Follow -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0004 
 -4.85 -1.51 2.87 -4.80 -1.62 2.83 
BigBroker 0.0033 0.0014 -0.0038 0.0030 0.0019 -0.0031 
 8.36 1.99 -8.51 6.75 2.47 -6.16 
Rel 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0031 0.0031 0.0030 -0.0031 
 4.10 2.74 -3.31 4.13 2.70 -3.33 
LnNbAn -0.0016 -0.0020 0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0021 0.0020 
 -5.67 -4.16 6.25 -5.57 -4.20 6.02 
Cer3 0.0139 0.0002 -0.0078 0.0138 0.0001 -0.0078 
 9.53 0.07 -4.77 9.50 0.06 -4.76 
R2 0.0079 0.0043 0.0043 0.0079 0.0044 0.0040 
F 49.76 9.78 30.25 50.13 9.91 28.62 
N obs 73711 24131 81780 73711 24131 81780 
 Hypotheses 
Reputation after MAD: 
4 6 0a a+ =  0.0023 0.0075 0.0007 0.0017 0.0070 0.0010 
t-stat 3.04 3.91 0.89 2.06 3.48 1.15 
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Table 6: Date of adoption of the EU regulation 
This table reports the t-stats of Davidson and Mc Kinnon method of model choice between non-nested models. The models 
are Model 1 with the adoption of the regulation measured as the transposition of MAD into national laws (one date per country), 
PostEC is with the adoption of the Commission Directives (December 23
rd
 , 2003) and PostDL is the deadline for 
implementation into national laws (October 12
th
, 2004). Coefficients significant at the 1% (5%) level are in bold (italics) 
 
 CMAD CIB 
 Upgrade Positive init. Downgrade Upgrade Positive init. Downgrade 
Postlaw vs 
PostEC 8.00 5.12 7.21 7.69 5.06 7.31 
PostEC vs 
Postlaw 2.83 1.64 -0.32 2.96 1.63 4.23 
Postlaw vs 
PostDL 5.16 2.42 6.47 5.40 2.54 6.62 
PostDL vs 
Postlaw 3.49 2.81 -0.10 3.76 2.76 -0.61 
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 Table 7: Spill-over of US regulation into EU 
This table reports the coefficients and the t-stats of coefficients associated with the change in the US regulation for upgrades, 
positive initiations. The model is:  
, , 0 1 1 , , 2 , , 3 , 4 , , 5 , 6 , , ,Re ker Reb j t t b j t b j t b t b j t j t j t b j tCAR a a PostUS g c Dcons c Follow c BigBro c l c LnNbAn c CER ε= + + + + + + ++ CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return defined in Section 4.1. It measures the market reaction of analyst a’s recommendation on firm j 
released at date t. PostUSReg is a dummy variable that measures the change in the US regulation. It is equal to 1 after SOX was 
passed into law and 0 before.  Dcons is the spread of the current recommendation from the “consensus” defined as the average 
of the ratings of the recommendations issued over the last six months on firm j. Follow measures the numbers of 
recommendations issued by others analysts on the same firm during the ten-day period preceding the current recommendation. 
BigBroker is equal to 1 if the broker is in the first decile in terms of recommendations issued over the previous year. Rel is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 indicating whether an annual earnings forecast was issued revision the recommendation and 0 
otherwise. LnNbAn is the logarithm of the numbers of analysts having issued recommendations over the last six months on firm 
j. CER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued contemporaneous to an earnings 
announcement. These variables are defined in Section 4.2.1. Coefficients significant at the 1% (5%) level are in bold (italics) 
and heteroscedastic consistent White t-statistics are in parenthesis below. 
 
 Upgrade Positive init. Downgrade 
Sample restricted to Global Banks  
Coef 0.0007 -0.0061 -0.0010 
t-stat 0.94 -4.24 -1.17 
R2 0.0052 0.0056 0.0031 
F 16.14 7.33 10.78 
N obs 20291 7853 22214 
Sample restricted to Local Banks  
Coef 0.0006 0.0018 0.0031 
t-stat 0.60 1.15 2.89 
R2 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 
F 2.23 1.70 2.97 
N obs 11476 4776 12370 
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Appendix 1: Definition of Public Enforcement 
Headings 1, 2 and 3 are from La Porta et al. (2006, p. 7-8). Headings 4 and 5 are collected and adapted 
from the “Report on administrative measures and sanctions available in Member States under the Market 
Abuse Directive” available from the Committee of European Securities Regulators at: http://www.cesr-
eu.org/index.php?page=document_details&id=4975&from_id=22. Every sub-index is the average  
 1. Characteristics of the Supervisor of securities markets 
Appointment Equals one if a majority of the members of the Supervisor are not 
unilaterally appointed by the Executive branch of government; and 
equals zero otherwise. 
 
Tenure Equals one if members of the Supervisor cannot be dismissed at the 
will of the appointing authority; and equals zero otherwise. 
Focus Equals one if separate government agencies or official authorities are 
in charge of supervising commercial banks and stock exchanges; and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Supervisor 
characteristics index 
Equals the arithmetic mean of Appointment, Tenure and Focus. 
 2. Power of the Supervisor to issue rules 
Rule-making power Equals one if Supervisor can generally issue regulations on stock 
exchanges without prior approval of other governmental authorities; 
equals one half if Supervisor can generally issue regulations on stock 
exchanges only with the prior approval; equals zero otherwise. 
 
 3. Investigative powers of the Supervisor art. 14.3. 
Documents Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative 
order commanding all persons to turn over documents; equals one 
half if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order 
commanding publicly traded corporations and/or their directors; 
equals zero otherwise. 
Witness Equals one if the Supervisor can generally subpoena all persons to 
give testimony; equals one half if the Supervisor can generally 
subpoena directors of publicly traded corporations; equals zero 
otherwise. 
Investigative powers 
index 
Equals the arithmetic mean of Documents and Witness. 
 4. Administrative pecuniary sanctions: articles 6.3 and 6.5 
 Equals one if the maximum administrative pecuniary sanction is 
higher than 1 000 000 EUR; equals one half if the maximum 
administrative pecuniary sanction is higher than 50 000 EUR (and 
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lower than 1 000 000 EUR); equals 0 if the maximum administrative 
pecuniary sanction is lower than 50 000 EUR. 
 5. Criminal sanctions articles: 6.3 and 6.5 
Imprisonment Equals one if the sanction can be imprisonment; equals 0 otherwise 
Fines Equals one if the maximum administrative pecuniary sanction is 
higher than 1 000 000 EUR; equals one half if the maximum 
administrative pecuniary sanction is higher than 50 000 EUR (and 
lower than 1 000 000 EUR); equals 0 if the maximum administrative 
pecuniary sanction is lower than 50 000 EUR. 
Criminal sanctions 
index 
Equals the arithmetic mean of Imprisonment and Fines. 
Public Enforcement 
index 
Equal the arithmetic mean of the “Supervisor characteristics index, 
the Power of the Supervisor to issue rules,  the Administrative 
pecuniary sanctions, the Investigative powers index and the Criminal 
sanctions index 
 
Appendix 2: Definition of control variables 
Variable Name Definition Sign 
Magnitude of the 
innovation 
Dcons 
, , , , ., ,
Re Re
b j t b j t j t
Dcons c c= −  
, ,
Re
a j t
c  is the recommendation issued by broker a on firm j at time t and 
., ,
Re
j t
c is 
the consensus (mean of the last recommendations issued for firm j less than a year 
ago) 
+ 
Timeliness Follow 
1 if the current recommendation is issued less than 10 days after the previous 
recommendation and is consistent with it (both the previous and the current 
recommendation are either favourable or unfavourable), 0 otherwise. 
_ 
Big Broker BigBroker 
1 if the broker belongs to the first decile in terms of recommendations issued over 
the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
+ 
Reliability Rel 
1 if an earnings forecast was issued by the same analyst during the ten-day period 
surrounding the recommendation, 0 otherwise. 
+ 
Coverage LnNbAn 
( ), ,j t j tLnNbAn Ln NbAn=  where ,j tNbAn is the number of analysts following the 
firm 
_ 
Broker Size BigBroker 
1 if broker belongs to the first decile in terms of recommendations issued over the 
previous year, 0 otherwise. 
+ 
Earnings release CER 1 if earnings are released during the event window, 0 otherwise. + 
 
The signs in column 4 represent the expected sign of the corresponding variable on stock 
returns for upgrades; downgrades have the opposite sign except Dcons. When Dcons is negative 
(positive), the corresponding coefficient has to be positive in order to amplify the negative 
(positive) reaction. 
